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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO PANEL 4
IRA LUPU. I want you to imagine a world in which this society,
acting through appropriate constitutional and political means, has
eliminated the religion clauses from the First Amendment, leaving
everything else in the Constitution intact. Is religion - and religious institutions and individuals - better or worse off after we
have made that move?
EDWARD GAFFNEY The next panel will, I think, address Professor Lupu's question directly, but my own answer is that we would be
very much the worse off without a Religion Clause in our Federal
Constitution. The Williamsburg Charter, a bicentennial document
that celebrated the first of our civil liberties, religious liberty, offered five reasons to support this conclusion:
(1) The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions have both a logical
and historical priority in the Bill of Rights. They have logical priority because the security of all rights rests upon the recognition that they are
neither given by the state, nor can they be taken away by the state. Such
rights are inherent in the inviolability of the human person. History demonstrates that unless these rights are protected our society's slow, painful progress toward freedom would not have been possible.
(2) The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions lie close to the heart
of the distinctiveness of the American experiment. The uniqueness of the
American way of disestablishment and its consequences have often been
more obvious to foreign observers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord
James Bryce, who wrote that "Of all the differences between the Old world
and the New, this is perhaps the most salient." In particular, the Religious
Liberty clauses are vital to harnessing otherwise centrifugal forces such as
personal liberty and social diversity, thus sustaining republican vitality while
making possible a necessary measure of national concord.
(3) The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions are the democratic
world's most salient alternative to the totalitarian repression of human
rights and provide a corrective to unbridled nationalism and religious warfare around the world.
(4) The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions provide the United
States' most distinctive answer to one of the world's most pressing questions
in the late-twentieth century. They address the problem: How do we live
with each other's deepest differences? How do religious convictions and political freedom complement rather than threaten each other on a small
planet in a pluralistic age? fn a world in which bigotry, fanaticism, terrorism and the state control of religion are all too common responses to these
questions, sustaining the justice and liberty of the American arrangement is
an urgent moral task.
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(5) The First Amendment Religious Liberty provisions give American society a unique position in relation to both the First and Third worlds. Highly
modernized like the rest of the First World, yet not so secularized, this society - largely because of religious freedom - remains, like most of the
Third World, deeply religious. This fact, which is critical for possibilities of
better human understanding, has not been sufficiently appreciated in American self-understanding, or drawn upon in American diplomacy and communication throughout the world.'

Let me offer another reason for my conclusion. At the end of my
paper I referred to the danger that the government's commands can
become too all-encompassing. For religious believers like myself,
that danger is described as idolatry. But the danger is very real for
believers and nonbelievers alike. For example, there is no duty that
the modern state lays on its citizens more onerous than the command to take the lives of others during wartime. It is no accident
that the history of governmental abuse of civil liberties during wartime is also pretty dismal.' One way of checking the war power is to
assure, as our Framers did, that this power is shared between the
Congress' and the Executive. 4 Another way of hobbling the government's all-encompassing power in wartime is to assure that conscientious objection to participation in war is honored and respected.
Although Congress did not enact a constitutional provision requiring
this result, it has repeatedly provided for this result through legislation ever since the first Continental Congress. In this sense, concern
for religious dissent has been a significant limit on the most awesome power of our government, even though conscientious objectors
often paid a high price for preserving the integrity of their consciences.5 On balance, then, I think that we would be much worse
off on these matters without the protection of the Religion Clause of
the First Amendment.
GERARD BRADLEY If you are referring to the First Amendment
to the Constitution, I think the religion clauses could go away and it
1. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER (1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5, 10-11 (1990).
2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR
POWERS SINCE 1918 (1989).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war); see also U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12-16 (discussing congressional powers relating to the Army, Navy, and
state militias).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 2, cl. I (stating that the president is Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy).
5. See, e.g., PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (1968).
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would not make much difference. If anything, we would be better
off. And that is partly because they did not mean much at all before
1940; and since then, their judicial interpretation has been generally
bad, that is, harmful for belief. And I think also because Madison
may have been right in the first place in his arguments in Federalist
No. 10 about the multiplicity of sects. Given the limited nature of
federal power, I think that we probably could have gotten along
without the First Amendment religion clauses. Madison did not suggest that Federalist No. 10 worked for the states; and it does not.
State governments do not enjoy the limitations, or have the limitations, of the Constitution's enumerated powers imposed on them. So
as to the state governments, I would say we would be worse off
without provisions something like the First Amendment clauses, judicially enforced.
JEFFREY SHAMAN: I would speculate that if we repeal the religion clauses tomorrow, that at least in one respect it would make a
very significant difference; and I think that is with government aid
to religiously-affiliated schools and prayer in school also. I think that
if the religion clauses were repealed, that many, many states would
re-establish school prayer - which in my opinion, as I said before,
is actually detrimental to religion and, I think, quite harmful to a
nation as religiously and culturally diverse as ours. But nevertheless,
I think that would happen. And I also think a number of states
would begin to make direct grants to religiously-affiliated schools,
which may be good or bad for religion. But at any rate, I think
those would be very significant differences in our society.
EDWARD GAFFNEY I would like to briefly respond to Professor
Bradley's point that we would be worse off, and not better off. In the
federal context, this is not simply because of the value of protecting
rights at the state and local levels in the state constitutions, but because the federal compact is not enforceable solely through judicial
injunctions. Law embodies the ability of someone like Professor
Sturm to get up yesterday and describe philosophic anthropology. It
has a power to teach us something important and imperative about
our society. We want to refrain from an establishment and we want
to protect free exercise of religion, and that is an important aspect
of our federal compact as well as our state. That is embodied in the
important legislation that goes back to the beginning of the Republic. Protection of constitutional values is not - as Professor Bradley
has rightly pointed out - to be put into the judicial bag. There are
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all kinds of ways in which we secure the rights that are mentioned
and put forth in quite general language in the Preamble; and this is
simply one of them: the "more perfect union" that the Founders
sought to establish.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK." This is a question for Professor Bradley. I
think you are absolutely right that the greater threat is at the state
and local levels - for reasons that Madison captures, although I
think you are overly optimistic about the federal government. It was
the federal government that persecuted the Mormons; it was the
federal executive that court-martialed Captain Goldman for wearing his yarmulke, and so forth - but the great threat is at the
states. And I think you analyzed that exactly right. Given that analysis in your answer to Professor Lupu, how can you tell us in your
main speech that exemptions ought to be provided by legislatures
and not by judges? Your faction analysis tells us that legislators are
not going to do it and, indeed, that legislators will be persecuting
rather than exempting at the state and local level.
GERARD BRADLEY- I am not sure if I could really join issue with
you on that. I am not so sure that I am guilty of some inconsistency.
It seems to me that most state legislators - who do not much care
about what Mormons do or what Native Americans do or what
wacky sects do - will respond to political pressure. State courts
ought to enforce their constitutional provisions vigorously - that is,
faithfully. What legislators will do, for example, is what the twentythree states or twenty-five states that have exempted sacramental
use of peyote did (including Oregon in the last year or so). In many
ways, there are relatively unpopular, small sects which are, in a
sense, surprisingly well treated by state legislators. My guess would
be, knowing nothing much about political theory or practice, that if
you have the sort of worst case scenarios for.people who opposed the
Smith result - what if they took away the sacraments of the Catholic Church? - well, I take it anybody belonging to that church
would make reversing a position of that kind the number one priority and would bargain off their votes with no other exchange expected except reversal of a particular law. To the extent there are
worst case scenarios imagined about persecution, I suspect politicians will respond because there will be a bloc of votes which can be
purchased with no other rider attached other than reversing a decision which probably nobody cares about. But I do not think that is
an inconsistent position; I do think that legislators do not care to
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persecute, so to speak, and will respond to political pressure. I think
many of them do have a rough and ready intention to promote religion as a good thing, and will see that exemptions in some circumstances, at least for some groups, would be a good thing because
they are good for religion.
EDWARD GAFFNEY: I would like to make two comments about
Professor Bradley's view of how legislatures grant religious exemptions. First, I think it is instructional that ancient Roman law contained a variety of exemptions for Jews, in order to accommodate
their monotheistic belief within a pagan environment that worshiped
national deities, including the emperor. Christians frequently
benefitted from these exemptions on the ground that like Jews, they
too were monotheists committed to the observance of the First Commandment. When, however, Christians moved beyond the status of
a persecuted minority at the beginning of the fourth century to the
status of the official religion of the empire in the second half Of that
century, one of the first things they did was to repeal the religious
exemptions for Jews. The exercise of Jewish faith became far more
difficult under the Christians than it had been under the pagans.
Second, I think that it is also important to focus on Justice
Scalia's suggestion in Employment Division v. Smith6 that religious
minorities like the Native Americans should resort to legislatures
for whatever relief they can get there. Given the insensitivity of the
Court, that is not bad advice. But I think that there is no good reason why, in our tripartite system of government, the judiciary should
not also afford realistic enforcement of a textually demonstrable
commitment to an important value like religious freedom. Justice
Scalia acknowledged that "leaving accommodation [of religion] to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in . . . . That understates the problem by a long shot. The real consequence of Smith is
that sincerely held religiously based conduct is not to be afforded
any significant protection from majoritarian control. Sending unpopular religious minorities to city councils and state legislatures for
relief is like sending the Jehovah's Witnesses to the very legislative
bodies in the 1930s that were doing their level best to get rid of
them. The sad reality is that small religious communities have been
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. Id. at 890.
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vulnerable to persecution, bigotry, calumny, and violence that
should be viewed as outrageous, but that has regrettably been
deeply ingrained in American history.8
GERARD BRADLEY: My response is twofold. The first is: All of
what you say is not an argument for changing the meaning of the
Constitution. You are arguing that something bad might happen;
and I agree something bad might happen. I am not that sanguine.
My other remark is: Show me the evidence that judges have been
demonstrably more concerned about minority religions and legislators. What evidence is there? It is an act of faith on your part.
Against the evidence, as far as I can tell.
EDWARD GAFFNEY: You are right, but only partly so. It is an
act of faith on my part that judges are capable of empathizing with
religious minorities and securing their liberty. But I do not think
that my faith flies in the face of all of the evidence, just some of it.
On the downside, Jews have not been well treated by the Court in
the Sunday closing law cases' or in the yarmulke case.'" And the
Court has been dismissive of the claims of unpopular religious minorities like Fundamentalists." The Court has been schizophrenic
towards the Amish, acknowledging their right to educate their own
children in their own homes, 2 but forcing them to pay Social Security taxes for their employees, even though they take care of their
elderly as a matter of religious obligation; 3 it was odd to see Chief
Justice Burger suggest that a tiny group of people who do not collect Social Security benefits could be blamed for the threatened collapse of the Social Security system that Burger imagined would flow
from exempting them from this tax.' " And the Court's treatment of
the spirituality of the Native Americans has been utterly
5
insensitive.1
8. See, e.g., GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 158-62 (1943);

Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 41620 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt.,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
10. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
11. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
12. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
13. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
14. Id. at 259-60.
15. See, e.g.. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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The list of botched cases could go on, but there is another side to
the story. For example, the Court has been fairly sympathetic to the
religious faith of the Jehovah's Witnesses. In 1940, it protected the
ability of the Witnesses to spread their message free from the threat
of arrest for breach of the peace.16 Three years later it protected the
Witnesses from efforts to drive them out of town by taxing their
distribution of religious literature.' 7 In 1940, it denied their plea for
an exemption from participation in the flag salute ceremony, 8 but
three years later it reversed that decision and gave us one of the
most ringing declarations on religious liberty: "[F]reedom of worship .. .may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections' 9 . . . .If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. ' 20 I think that the widespread opposition to the
Court's ruling in the Smith case stems from the fact that the majority expects the Court to be antimajoritarian when it comes to basic
civil liberties. We found repugnant the Court's retreat from its earlier history of protecting the exercise of religion by requiring government lawyers to demonstrate a truly compelling interest before
they could prevail over a sincere religious claim. In other words, the
Court was right in Sherbert v. Verner 2' and wrong when it abandoned the compelling interest standard in Smith.
EMILY FOWLER HARTIGAN [University of Nebraska]: I think
that the question is: Is the First Amendment hostile to religion as
the Court now interprets the First Amendment? I think the loss of
the "both/and" is hostile to religion. That is, of course we can hope
that legislators will care about minority religions. Why should we
give up one of the three branches? Why should we not want both
branches to care about minority religions? I really do not understand why we should give up Supreme Court jurisprudence, which
believes that the Bill of Rights is something that the Supreme Court
should be concerned about. There are two points that I think frame
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Id. at 642.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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that, which come from Professor Lovin's remarks. He talks about
the worry about the capture or the domestication of religion, which
Professor Hauerwas talked about. I am concerned about what happens to law. If, in fact, religion is separated out from the public
discourse, we lose the spirit in the law. That is, as a public, as a
people, we lose. And I find this in teaching my students. If I can
talk to them, they are worried about: "Can I be a lawyer and not
lose my soul?" That is something which has profound impact on
what the "public" will be when they go out as lawyers. In addition,
there is a concern about what the quality of public discourse is, and
how much inspiriting of the public discourse is allowable. And I
think that that is tremendously important for law itself. It has become desiccated at the federal level. You can see in some of the
state constitutional jurisprudence - particularly in the nineteenth
century - where it is not desiccated, where there is still a notion of
the spirit of the law which taps something like what Michael Perry
calls "naturalism." But when you look at the federal constitutional
jurisprudence, it is deadly. And so I am worried about the other side
of it, that is, the hostility to the law as I understand it (with spirit),
not as the Supreme Court at this time understands it. And I am not
willing to give that up to the United States Supreme Court. But I
think that the question, which does need to be profoundly deconstructed, is what the hostility to true law is.
The other thing that Professor Lovin talked about was wanting a
relative or a situated freedom, that is, accepting the sense in which
we are profoundly socially constituted and constituted by - for
those of us who believe that - a Creator in a created world. My
concern - and you talked about getting critical distance on that
"relative" discourse and freedom - my concern about that is that if
we leave it to majoritarian culture and the majoritarian institutions
without the voice of the Other, we will get a recapitulation of what I
have experienced at this conference - which is an incredible, just a
tearing, alienation for me - because I come where people are
speaking to the things which are the most crucial to me, and I come
as a feminist, and I hear people speaking to my heart and then
wounding it. I did not anticipate what was going to happen for me,
because Professor Hauerwas is someone I know through people who
love and respect him really deeply. And I sort of did not have my
defenses up. And I was beginning to realize that these were all men
talking and all unbelievably masculine, male discourse - except for
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Professor Sturm, bless his heart, who said, "[tihe declaration of the
rights of man [sic] . . ." and used inclusive language; and he is the
only who has done that. And Professor Hauerwas is going through
all of this wonderful prophetic speech and it's full of men. Not one
woman was mentioned in any way. If you listen to his propositional
thinking -- what he is talking about in terms of his "truth" - the
propositional version is "outrageous." But you listen to his stories and you hear him saying, "Well, I want Jews to make Jews" - his
story says, in fact, that he does not have a sort of imperialistic notion of truth. And he is a narrative theologian; the story is important. But then he told the story of A Man for All Seasons.2 And he
got to the one place where there was a woman - because it is Meg
who tells her father what he attributes to the son-in-law. And goddamned if he did not tell an untrue story.23 That is what I am worried about in terms of giving up the Supreme Court's notion - letting them say that Native Americans can be erased - because the
"voices of the Others are what is absolutely crucial. So we need to
ask it from all three branches of government.
EDWARD GAFFNEY: I invite Professor Bradley to reply to Professor Hartigan. Why do you insist that only the political branches,
and not the judiciary as well, should be engaged in protecting religious liberty?
GERARD BRADLEY: Well, I think maybe the distinction I was
trying to draw has been either rejected or obscured again. Because I
am saying that I think the enterprise of construing the Constitution
starts in a certain place and time with a certain authoritative document, and is not the freestanding analysis of politics - good or bad
- that you are proposing to me as a reason to construe the Constitution differently. I simply insist - if there is any insistence on my
part - that this Constitution and its construction are not within the
same order of discourse that the negative or hostile responses to my
proposal are in. I agree that, philosophically, you can talk in a dif22. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A DRAMA IN Two ACTS (1962).
23. 1 struggled with this on reflection, and found that there was a hidden paradox. The play, as
written by Bolt, has "son Roper" ask about "the words"; the movie, with Bolt's screenplay, sets
the entire conversation between father and daughter. My students this semester, having used the
movie as locus for their jurisprudence midterm, had focused on the intense symbolic and narrative
significance of that very conversation, in terms of the role of the woman in More's story. So it is
not that Hauerwas did not have his "homework" right in a technical sense, but that he unrelentingly told the male version of every text and story, even when the fuller, truer, more human
version was available.
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ferent way and come out with a different conclusion about what is
right or wrong, good or bad. To me, that is not, as such, an argument for construing the Constitution differently. And I do not reject
a role for the judiciary. But frankly, to engage the argument on its
own terms - courts, especially the Supreme Court, have been on
automatic pilot along the course of liberalism for the last forty years
or so. They seem to have imbibed the harmony and neutrality principles in their youth, somewhere in their formative years. Other
than viewing them as on automatic liberal pilot, I see them as simple bunglers.
EDWARD GAFFNEY: I am glad that Professor Bradley has clarified that the judiciary does have an important role in protecting religious liberty. I suppose now that the focus of my disagreement with
him is over how bad the bungling of that task has been. For me the
cases decided by the lower courts in the wake of Smith illustrate
graphically a wholesale abandonment of responsibility to enforce the
limits placed on our government by the Bill of Rights. I agree that
in our democracy we must press our elected representatives to grant
legislative exemptions for religious conduct from generally applicable laws. But part of that dynamic is that the representatives often
take their lead from the courts. So when the courts abandon the
field, that can send exactly the wrong message to the political
branches. In other words, I think that the cases in the lower courts
after Smith are a strong argument for Professor Hartigan's point
that we need to ratchet up the judicial protection of religious liberty
and not leave that precious freedom exclusively to local city councils
or state legislatures.
ROBIN LOVIN: I thought that the last point that Professor Hartigan made was powerful and really needs to be allowed to stand on
its own. But I did want to say in response to the first part of what
she has suggested - and maybe in response to some of the general
discussion that has been going on - that there is a problem with
some of our jurisprudence and some of our legal philosophy that it is
locked in this modern period of solution to the problem of church
and state. And I just want to open up the possibility that some of
the things that we have been pointing to - in terms of, as you say,
"never meeting a statute that you did not like," the growth of a very
positivist and statist interpretation of these constitutional provisions
- reflects the fact that when the mainstream modern position of
.reliance on individual reason and conscience fails, we fall back upon
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the Hobbesian and Marsilian solution: We have got to have a sovereign who will decide for us. And among the other dangers it represents, this is a fallback to what I regard as the least desirable of the
modern solutions to the problem, and a real failure to come to grips
with that problem of situated freedom which seems to me to be
what we have really got to address in legal theory as well as
philosophically.
QUESTION.-This is directed mostly towards Professor Lovin. Your
comments on the postmodern phrasing of the question of religious
freedom suggested to me that the other commentators have set forth
kind of a litany of the history of how the majority's views of religion
have worked their way into the interpretation of the First Amendment. I am wondering if what some of the postmodern thinkers are
suggesting is that there is no such thing as a "disestablishment
clause" because it is inevitable that the majority's will is going to be
imposed in the process of decisionmaking because - as you said there is no concept of freedom or distancing from one's history.
Could you just comment on that?
ROBIN LOVIN. Right, there would be no disestablishment because
what you operate with is some kind of hegemony theory that says:
Always, the religious beliefs of the controlling powers in the society
are going to be enforced by all of the power mechanisms in the society. So there would be no legitimate disestablishment clause. But
also, of course - as I say - there would not be a legitimate Free
Exercise Clause either, because there is not such a thing as what the
Framers of the First Amendment would have understood as freedom
that could be legally recognized.
QUESTION: I hesitated throughout the Conference to articulate a
question that concerns me. It seems that there are many different
paradigms of church. There's the theologian's church. There's Stanley Hauerwas's church. There's the lawyer's church. And then, from
my own particular point of view, there is the church administrator's
church that represents an enormous economic, an enormous social,
established institution that depends almost entirely for its continuing
existence on various forms of government subsidy as well as regulation. I have been working for quite a number of years with religious
women. Many small orders of religious women - who maintain
their own colleges, school systems, hospitals, and such things as
these - were unable financially to get into the Social Security sys-
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tem years ago in 1962 when that became a possibility. They now are
in real deep financial problems. You are all aware, of course, of the
extent of these problems. But this brings into question - and it
brings to my mind constantly - the whole relationship of 401K
plans and the enormous amount of money involved in religiously related institutional funds and their administration and so forth, as
well as the overall comportment of religious entities - the major,
established religious entities - in lobbying for protection of these
funds as well as the other types of institutional concerns. For example, Bowen v. Kendrick24 would never have even been possible thirty
or forty years ago had there not been a pre-existing social agency
structure that was capable of absorbing these funds. So I think that
there are many different concepts of church. I think some of the
hostility that is felt by leaders of church entities arises - as Professor Bradley indicated rather bleakly - out of state court tort litigation, the general demise of charitable immunity, and the conceptualization of church institutions much as if they were businesses, and
the lack of any kind of specific prerogatives. So when you take a
look at hostility and you take a look at the role of religion, the establishment of religion in America, I think there are many different
paradigms of religion. There is a hostility that is engendered by
abuses of the television ministries and the amount of money that is
involved there. And there is a certain amount of hostility engendered in people going into Congress and being subjected to very sophisticated, very professional lobbying that twenty or thirty years
ago would not even have been conceivable. So I think, when you
look at the institution and where the First Amendment is right now,
the questions that you have addressed have been so captivating and
interesting I have hesitated to inject this; but I think it is a little
element of realism. And this is my question: Since 1940, since
2 5 the First Amendment is applicable to
Cantwell,
the states; but to
what extent does it immunize the church from being treated in a
state court - or a church institution, a retirement fund, a religious
community, a hospital, a school, or anything else - just as if it
were a business? Robert Clark wrote a very strong article about ten
years ago to the effect that charitable hospitals, religiously related
or not, should no longer be considered charities; they are simply
24. 487 U.S. 589 (1962).
25. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

1992]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

businesses. 6 I wonder if I can formulate a question in these terms:
To what extent is it a violation of either one of the clauses to be
treated in state court as if you were simply a business?
EDWARD GAFFNEY: I guess this is a classic instance of the lawyerly reply, "It depends." For example, I do not think that there is
any constitutional violation in requiring a religious organization to
pay tax on unrelated business income. And I do not think that
religious organizations are constitutionally entitled to charitable immunity from litigation over contracts that they form or over torts
that they commit. On the other hand, I think that it would be a
profound mistake to expand Dean Clark's point to mean that religious organizations should be subject to every form of regulation
that the government can conceive of for business corporations. To
me, one of the deepest dangers presented by the Smith case is that
we will begin to think that there is really nothing very special about
religion in our society, that mere formal neutrality is enough. As
Professor Laycock has demonstrated, mere formal neutrality'treating religion like everyone else - is a sure recipe for disaster.2 8
Let me illustrate this point by reference to an unpopular religious
group that I have had the privilege of representing in California, the
Hare Krishnas. These people are devotees of an ancient faith that
seems new or strange to many of us Westerners. They are now subject to losing all of their monasteriies and places of religious worship
throughout the country because of a single tort. The tort consisted
of inflicting emotional injury on the parents of a young devotee by
lying about her whereabouts. I have no brief to write in defense of
the lie. In fact, one of the things that most impressed me about the
Hare Krishnas is that they were willing to acknowledge their mistake and to change their policy of accepting teenagers into their
community without their parents' consent. But no matter what one
thinks about their liability for the infliction of emotional distress,
the sum that the jury awarded against them - over $32 million in
punitive damages - -isan awful lot of money for an emotional injury. The award was reduced on remittitur and by the court of appeals, but is was exceeded in legal history only by the award against
26. See Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1416 (1980).
27. I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
28. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).
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the Ford Corporation in the Pinto case.
I do not think that the Hare Krishnas or any other religious organization should be treated the same as for-profit corporations.
Here is why. Stockholders risk their capital when they invest in a
for-profit corporation. They stand to benefit from the corporation's
activities, so there is some basis for making them pay for the corporation's wrongdoing. That rationale does not fit very well in the context of a not-for-profit corporation, to which people contribute with
no expectation of personal financial gain, and over which they have
no direct control. More specifically, it seems outrageous to me for
the government to reach into the collection plate of a religious organization to provide a large windfall for a fully compensated victim. Moreover, we do not allow a jury to impose punitive damages
on a municipal corporation sued for a civil rights violation committed, for example, by a police officer, because to do so would be to
force the taxpayers to pay for an act over which they had no control.29 A similar logic prohibits the imposition of punitive damages
on labor unions even when they are guilty of a failure to represent
all of the workers, for it would be the rank and file who would actually have to pay for the errors of their leadership."0 For reasons like
these, I am opposed to the imposition of punitive damages on religious organizations.
Let me draw an analogy from New York Times v. Sullivan.31
First, let me simply observe that the Sullivan case illustrates the
benefit of the incorporation doctrine. The Sullivan Court performed
an invaluable service for the protection of the human rights of African-Americans who were being clobbered by state and local authorities in the Old South of the 1960s. If state libel law had gone unchecked by federal judicial power at that time, it would have
crushed the civil rights movement, or at least dealt the movement a
severe blow. Perhaps Professor Bradley's opposition to the incorporation doctrine is limited to the incorporation of the Religion
Clause, but in any event I am glad that the Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were thought to be incorporated against Alabama
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, I note that in Sullivan the Court did not hold that the
29. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
30. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
31. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of the case in its historical setting, see
LEWIS. MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991).
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tort of libel is constitutionally invalid, but it did offer sound reasons
why that tort is subject to constitutional restraints arising from the
profound national commitment to vigorous political debate. I would
conclude from Sullivan that the Free Exercise Clause does not necessitate the doctrine of charitable immunity for religious organizations, but that it does mandate at least the kind of concern for the
well-being of religious institutions that the Court showed in Sullivan
for the news media. Religious organizations should not in my view
be put out of business through outrageously high punitive damages
for mistakes they make in conducting the corporal works of mercy,
works they engaged in as part of their spiritual ministry long before
these acts became part of the tender outreach of an all-compassionate, or at least an all-encompassing, government after the New
Deal.
QUESTION: One of the things that we are missing in society today
is that real commitment to sacrifice. And one of the leaders in the
church of which I am a part said once that "any religion that's in
truth a religion is worth dying for." I am pleased that he didn't say,
"worth killing for." But it is worth dying for. It is worth sacrificing
for. It is worth giving for. I was appalled yesterday by Professor
Hauerwas's comments as well. In particular insofar as he said,
"Well, you know, there are going to be some people who are going
to suffer out there. And that's just the way it is." I think what we
have done to the Native Americans' religion and cutting the heart
out of their religion and the suffering we have created is not only
just appalling but not a very wise thing for us to do in an anthropological sense. I think if we did more to nurture conscience, if we did
more in community, we would be a lot better off as a world. If we
created a system - if Professor Marshall, instead of saying, "I
don't want any exemptions; we're going to have equality here, no
exemptions!," said, "We're going to create a system where we respect these kinds of exemptions and respect sacrifice and do what we
can to facilitate it!," especially in those areas, whether it is feminism
or whether it is religion, those things that we feel so deeply that we
are compelled to do - that if we had a system like that, that what
we ought to be talking about is how we create that kind of system
where there are perhaps some limitations on the excesses but where
we really protect that core. And I find also appalling what Professor
Bradley said, in the sense of the same sense that Professor Hartigan
did. I mean, give us every opportunity to be able to argue these
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cases. Now, I think you are right in one sense in that we ought to
take it to the legislature where we can get something more than an
interstitial answer and an answer that historically has been "no" but
that we ought to have every recourse available for the Native American or if my daughter goes to school fasting because of our religion
and they tell her at noon, "By golly, you're going to eat because
eating makes you healthy and makes you a better student." I mean,
where do we draw those kinds of lines? And I think Professor Marshall would be a lot better off if he would just broaden conscience to
include ideology and recognize it. In fact, if any ideology's worth its
salt, it is worth sacrificing for just like religion. And that Professor
Bradley would do better to say, "We ought to look to the legislature
but we'll leave this door open as well."
WILLIAM MARSHALL: I would not disagree with that. I think we
would be better if we broaden conscience to include a protection for
nonreligious conscience as well. A number of years ago, Professor
Tushnet said - looking at the then Supreme Court, which looks
like a bastion of liberalism compared to the current one - that that
would be unlikely given the Court's make-up. I think that is right.
The question of what we do now, I think, is dealing with the Court
we have. And it is a difficult choice. Professor Laycock and Professor Shaman have both made incredibly strong arguments that the
inequality between religions, which failing to grant exemptions creates, is a terrible problem. But it still seems to me that a deliberate
preference of one kind of belief over another kind of belief in this
context politically empowers that type of belief and leads to some of
the other problems that we discussed before, as well as just being
plain not called for by history or precedent. And I just think it is
wrong to say that a guy working in an armaments factory is going
to be excused from working there if he couches his belief in religious
terms but is not going to be excused if that very same belief, regardless of the level of passion, regardless of the level of commitment, is
couched in moral and philosophical terms. I would agree with you
that a better world would protect consciences of all kinds. With respect to what we have now, I think it is better either to deny them
all or to grant them all.

